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tPolitical Significance of the Alien and Sedition Laws
Development of democracy through the freedom of public expression
as a background for the Alien and Sedition Laws.
3 *1 Sr *74-4-
D.
Growth of the freedom of the press in England.
A. Press under the Stuart3
1.
The control of licensers
E. Press under the Commonwealth
1. Its use. as a party instrument.
2. The "Areopagetica" by John Milton.
C. Press following the Restoration
1. Expiration of the licensing act, 1695.
2. Increasing use of newspapers.
Press during the 1st half of 18th century
1 . Modern newspaper
2. Still a party instrument
3. Censorship of Parliament
4. Stamp regulations
Press during the latter half of 18th century
1. Intensity of discussion
2. Interpretation of the Libel Law
3. Government at issue with the press
(a) "Letters of Junius," and the resulting trial
4. Struggle over the rights of juries in Libel cases
(a) Stockdale Case
(b) Libel Law of 1792.
^ _a
;
' M, : .v' • • 1
»
.
*
.
.
.
t%
II. Growth of the freedom of the mass in America
A. Before the Revolution
1. Control exerted by England.
2. Zenger case
B. After the Revolution
1. Federal Constitution
The Political Background of the Alien and Sedition Laws.
I. The political situation in United States in 1796.
A. National loaders
1. John Adams
2. Thomas Jefferson
B. Presidential election of 1796.
1. Republican party
(a) Its platform
2. Federalist party
(a) Faction led by Hamilton
3. Result of election
II. Quarrel with France
A. Effect of the European war on United States
B. Treaty of 1778 with France
1. Its content
2. Its interpretation
C. Jay Treaty with England
1. 1 1 3 content
2. Its effect on the country
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tD. Recall of Monroe
E. Attitude of the French Directory
1. Dismissal of Pinckney
F. Extra session of Congress, May 15, 1797
1. Adams’ message
2. Character of the Congress
G. Increasing hostility of France
1.
Its effect in United States
K. Regular session of Congress, Nov. 13, 1797
1. Efforts of the United States’ Commissioners
2. Divided opinions on the foreign situation
3. X.Y.Z. disclosures
4. National defense measures
Alien and Sedition Laws
I. Content of the Laws
A. Naturalization Law
B. Alien Law
C. Sedition Law
II. Alien Law
A. Objections made to it by the Republicans
1. Alien Law denies trial by jury.
2. The Law a violation of the first article and
ninth section of the Constitution
3. The Lav/ is too severe.
B. Defense made by the Federalists
1. Trial by jury not denied by the Law.
(a) Constitution not made for aliens.
(b) Removal of aliens not necessarily a
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The Law ia not unconstitutional
(a) First article and ninth section of the
Constitution applies only to slaves.
(b) The prevention of emmigration is differ-
ent from removal.
(c) Federal government has authority to re-
move dangerous aliens.
III. Sedition Law
A. Objections made to it by the Republicans
1. Congress has no delegated power to pas3 the
Sedition Law
2. Sedition Law violates the first amendment of
the Constitution.
3. Operation of the Law is unjust
4. States are competent fo handle libel cases
5. The Law is monarchial in its tendencies
6. The Law is contrary to the principles upon
which the government was founded.
7. Minor objections
B. Defense made by the Federalists
1. Sedition Law rests on precedents
2. The Law does not violate the "liberty of the
press"
(a) "Liberty of the press" misunderstood.
(1) Liberty means a right to publish
without restraint.
(2) Liberty does not mean license
(b) Sedition Lav/ makes nothing penal that
was not so before the law was passed
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(c) Sedition Law is not an "abridgment” of
the "liberty of the press".
IV. Organization of sentiment by the Republican party.
A. By means of newspapers, pamphlets, and petitions
B. By means of the sympathy created by trials held
under the Sedition Law.
C. By means of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions
V. Political revolution of 1800.
A. Part played by the Alien and Sedition Laws
1. Lav/s made the basis for a popular protest
on constitutional grounds
2. Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions establish
the Laws as a paramount issue in the campaign.
3. Trials held under the Laws keep the issue continu-
ously before the people.
B. Other contributing political factors.
1. Lack of harmony within the Federalist party
2. An increasing desire for peace and economy
3. A growing feeling against England.
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Political Significance of the Alien and Sedition Acts
Although the discussion of the growth of the freedom of the pres 8
is only remotely related to the Alien and Sedition Acts in their polit-
ical significance, it yet does bear a relationship which here warrants
a more than mere casual discussion. It is out of this development of
liberty of press and speech that came those principles upon which the
constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Acts could be challenged,
thereby giving a legal strength to the forces organized to defeat the
authors of the Acts. Final opposition to the party responsible for the
Act 3 therefore had the sanction of const itional arguments, and that
made a very potent rallying cry.
Discussion of the growth of the freedom of the press in so far as
it affects the United States must begin in England. England was one of
the first countries to experiment with printing, and during the last
quarter of the fifteenth century it was firmly established.
There appears to have been but little opposition to its growth at
first, in fact it received every encouragement, and only when its edu-
cational and broadening influences became apparent was it hindered. The
Grown ana Church however saw in its educational and broadening influ-
ences a positive danger to security and conformity, respectively, if the
press were not restrained. Because of this there arose that strict
censorship of the Church over the press and the limiting of discussion
through the government license.
Up to the Stuart period boohs, pamphlets, tracts, had been pub-
lished, but the printing had been confined to London, Oxford, and Cam-
bridge, and then under careful supervision. Patents and monopolies
protected vested interests from attacks of too frank strangers. Under,
the Stuarts, however, the newspaper began to take form, "The Weekly
. / ,:c
'
.
-2 -
Newes” printed for Nicholas Bourne and Thomas Archer about the year
1622 is one, and the "English Mercury," 1588, in the British Museum
was held to be another, but it has been proved false.
But in all these attempts there v/as nothing like freedom of the
press. The licenser, supported by the Courts, especially the Court of
the Star Chamber, v/as too pov/erful. In spite of this, however, there
were certain indications of progress. Sufficient ground had been gained
to warrant a firm insistence in the Stuart period that free speech wa3
a "right" and not a granted privilege, within Parliament; and the princ-
iple was bound to extend to other fields. And again, there v/as growing
a sentiment against the limitations of the licensing system. This was
apparent in 1649 when Gilbert Mabbott resigned the office of licenser
because he believed it lawful to publish anything without a license pro-
vided the author’s and printer’s names were attached. This was a cer-
tain indication that the time was coming when the government could no
longer restrict by means of the license, but would be compelled to use
the courts and prosecute as libellous any objectionable v/ritings.
The latter half of the seventeenth century, including the Common-
wealth, and the period soon after the Restoration, brought changes that
affected the position of the press in two ways. In the first place the
last of the licensing laws was allowed to expire in 1695. Long Parli-
ament had continued the policy of the royal government in this respect,
only to call forth that eloquent plea for the liberty of unlicensed
printing, Milton’s "Areopagetica . " The great weapon of royal authority,
the Court of the Star Chamber, was abolished in February, 1641. Thus
the struggle for a free and uncontrolled press v/as to be shifted to the
court room, where the law of libel v/as to be contested.
In the second place a new variety of publications began to appear.

t-3-
Tracts and newspapers entered into the struggle between Court and
Parliament. Between 1640 and 1660 about 30,000 political papers
and phamphlets were issued. The press had become a party instrument,
and Parliament did not hesitate to show its intolerance and partizan
character when it passed severe orders that royalist and prelatical
writers might be held in check.
During the first half of the eighteenth century the growth of the
press followed lines laid down during the previous period. The two
significant features, however, which clearly show its position are these
first its rapid growth as a party instrument, and second the methods of
control employed by the government.
In an age crowded by literary men of the first rank, with such
men writing as: Newton, Pope, Swift, Addison, Steele, Defoe, Prior, it
is nevertheless true that none v/ere exempt from a political bias and
were often too willing to employ their talents in aid of politics. Thus
Swift, Bolingbroke, Atterbury, and Prior were numbered among the Tories,
while the Whigs claimed Addison, Steele, and Defoe. The party in power
did much to encourage political writing by giving rewards; thus French-
ard, author of Cato’s Letters, was given the post of ’’commissioner of
wine-licenses’’ by Walpole, and Mr* Concannon, a ministerial writer, was
made Attorney-General of Jamaica by New-castle. Swift had his "Examin-
er’’; Defoe, the ’’Review;’’ Leslie, the "Rehearsals;" while the "Postman",
"Flying Post," "English Post" and many ethers indicate the increased
(1)
interest in political literature.
The literature was surely becoming a party weapon of much power
and widening influence can be further seen by such instances as these:
(1) England in the XVIIIth Century-- Lecky. Vol. I. p.66.
.'.'Of.
1
the "True-born Englishman" of Defoe, 1700-1701 which was written to
check agitation against William as a foreigner, had nine editions in
four years, and was printed twelve times during the same period with-
out the concurrence of the author, while no less than 80,000 cheap ed-
,
itions were disposed of in the streets of London. A forgotten Whig
pamphlet by Benson, published as an answer to the Tory addresses to
the Queen after the impeachment of Sacheverell were sold to the number
( 1 )
of 60,000.
Swift’s "Conduct of the Allies" to prepare the country for the
Peace of Utrecht amounted to 11,000 copies in a single month. The
"Spectator" had a daily circulation of 14,000; the "Craftsman," which
contributed so much to the downfall of Walpole, had a circulation of
( 2 )
10
,
000 .
Instances, such as the above, could be multiplied giving every evi-
dence of the great use made of the press by political parties, and like-
wise of the eagerness of the people for such news. This has so much of
the modern aspect in it that one might well date the major features of
the modern newspaper from this period. But it means vastly more, be-
cause through these very features were to come the educational value of
the free and unrestricted newspaper, and the ushering in of that period
when a government would need neither licenser nor libel law for protec-
tion but simply a well informed public opinion. Mr. Danvers spoke as
prophet as well when he said in 1738, "The people of Great Britain are
governed by a power that never was heard of as a supreme authority in
(3)
any age or country before . It is the government of the Press."
(1) England in the XVIIIth Century—Lecky. Vol. I. p 66.
(2) " ,T x " " "
" " I. p 66.
( 3 )
" » » " " " " I. p 561 (Quoted by Lecky.
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The second feature which marks the development of the press during
the first half of eighteenth centure is the attitude of the government
toward its growth. In the preceding period it was observed that the
control of the press through the licenser had lapsed, and that the strug-
gle could be shifted to but one place, and that was to the courts. The
whole of the eighteenth centure becomes therefore a legal contest between
the press on the one hand and the government on the other, with an
ultimate victory for the press.
Now the first half of this century is marked by no great legal strug
gles, in fact the use of the press as a party instrument probably retard-
ed the recognition of its freedom. Parties took up the warfare where
the Kings had left off, and were quite as relentless, though perhaps
less brutal. Opposition writers could expect no mercy, and Parliament
usually had "a sermon to condemn or a parson to roast”, or a member to
expel. Sometimes rivalry was expressed in coarser ways; a Mr. Dyer was
beaten in a coffee-house by Lord Mohun, and Tutchin, who had braved
Commons and Attorney-General was actually beaten to death in the streets.
But in spite of this apparent severity one cannot help but feel that it
was on the whole quite harmless. The possibilities of the press were
becoming clearer, and many saw that often an objectionable press could
be more easily curbed by employing writers to uphold the opposite side
( 1 )
than through the process of the law.
That the characteristics of the press during this period should
have been such as above outlined is quite to be expected when the period
is viewed from the political angle. Politically the first half of the
eighteenth century was one of transition. That great feature of Eng-
ii ) Constitutional History of England--May . Vol. II. P. 1C7.
..
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lish government --the Cabinet—was in the making; and party feeling was
always a very definite thing to be reckoned with.
The Whig and Torie parties were in contrast both as to make up and
principles. The Tory party included the landed gentry and supporters of
the established church, while the Whig party drew its members from the
commercial and the nonconformist classes --the former was naturally con-
servative, and the latter, liberal.
The law making a property qualification essential to membership
in Parliament was a Tory measure, opposed by the Whigs. Likewise the oc-
casional Conformity Act and Schism Act (both act3 directed against Dis-
senters) were Tory measures, later repealed during the Whig ascendancy.
Along those same lines the Whigs and Tories were divided on the
press. The Tories, especially in time of Fitt and Castlereagh were
jealous of its powers, and did not hesitate to punish it with severity.
The Tory ministry of Anne by the passage of a Stamp Act in 1712 attempt-
ed to repress licentiousness by imposing a stamp tax on newspapers and
advertisements. This was aimed to limit the circulation of cheap pap-
ers, and continued in varied forms till our own time. Eut the V/higs
were very tolerant of press criticisms. This was no doubt due in a
large measure to Walpole, who was the dominating figure in Whig poli-
cies for the most part of this period. Walpole was liberal, good nat-
ured, no great reader, and not sensitive, and the press under him en-
joyed practical freedom, except when the Jacobitical writers became too
rampant
.
The press had thus assumed during the first part of eighteenth
century much of its present character; its full freedom was still, how-
ever, to be defined and incorporated into the lav/. The next period saw
that accomplished.
''
'
.
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The latter lialf of the eighteen century is therefore mainly one
of litigation, during which the press emerges fully and freely recog-
nized as the proper means for public discussion, instruction, and crit-
icism. Political discussions up to this period had been mainly con-
ducted in tracts and pamphlets, and although the political element may
be found in newspapers as far back as the Revolution, and often during
reign of Anne it yet is true that only during George Ill's reign did the
newspaper fully accept the responsibility of political discussion. This
transition from pamphlet to paper is rather interesting. Walpole not-
iced that political news was often confined to Saturday issues, and John-
son published his "Idler'' every Saturday in a newspaper. Gradually more
attention was given to such topics, and by 17S8 daily and evening edi-
tions were printing political topics. With this change it was natural
that reporters and printers should be brought into closer relations with
the State, and the position of the newspaper was certain to be elevated
thereby. It is in this period that the newspaper rose above party war-
fare, and becomes a great popular power--the representatives, as well as
the critic, judge and moulder of public opinion. That the press admir-
ably accepted this responsibility, and has fully met the requirements
of this widened sphere is without question. From this period date the
great modern papers: "horning Chronicle," 1770 (extinct after 1862);
"Morning Post," 1772; "Morning Herald," 1780; "Times," 1788 (still un-
( 1 )
disputedly the first newspaper of the world).
It was probably inevitable that the newspaper should thus come to
its own; its opportunities were clearly manifest, and increasing cir-
culations necessitated an increase of its functions, and a recognition
of its place and influence. In spite of the stamp duty of 1712, and its
(1) England in the XVIIIth Century--Lecky . Vol. Ill p. 277.
1.
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increase in 1776, by Lord. North, from 1 penny to 1 l/2 pence the press
continued to grow. The following statistics afford some idea of this
growth: in 1755, the government issued 7,411, 757 stamps: in 1760,
9,464,790; in 1774, 12,300,000. These facts further attest to the in-
creasing press activity: in 1777 there were 17 papers in London, 7 of
which were daily; between 1769 and 1771 seven new magazines were pub-
lished in England; and in 1778 appeared the first Sunday paper, Johnson’s
( 2 )
"Sunday Monitor."
But, as previously stated, this growth was assured only through
struggles in the courts. The position of a free and unhampered press
was not firmly established till the end of the eighteenth century. If
the press were confronted by the licenser, created monopolies, and Star
Chamber practices during latter half of seventeenth century, was made
subservient to party influence during first half of eighteenth, and in
both periods it had successfully resisted unprogressive influences, and
had continued to expand, it is quite apparent that the only restriction
to its complete usefulness lay in the application of the law of libel.
The last few paragraphs have attempted to show the rise of the newspaper
from a party organ with its narrow and prejudiced influences to a posi-
tion of national power and dignity--the representative not of factional,
but of popular opinion. The next few paragraphs will be devoted to a
discussion of the doctrine of libel as applied in several important cas-
es--struggles which finally established the liberty of the press by the
Libel Law of 1792.
The legal position of newspapers at this time was doubtful. The
House of Commons excepted libel among those offenses covered by Parl-
iamentary privilege, and there was a very positive desire on the gov-
(2) England in the XVIIIth Century—Lecky. Vcl. Ill p. 248 & 278.
t'
qrnment * s part to so withdraw pross cases that a review by juries would
be harmless. And thus by "ex-officio" informations the Attorney-Gen-
eral was able to send press cases to trial without the assent of the
grand jury. The trials were then held before judges who laid down a
doctrine on libels which transferred the decision from the juries to
themselves. According to Walpole it would appear that these "ex-offic-
io 1 ' informations were much used at this time, for about 1763 he states
that some two hundred were filed, a number greater than the prosecutions
of the previous thirty-three years. But in 1791 the Attorney-General
stated that during the last thirty-one years there had been seventy pro-
secutions for libel; fifty convictions; twelve received severe sentences;
and in five cases the pillory was part of the punishment; so that it
seems probable that many cases included in Walpole* s statement must have
been abandoned.
The libel doctrine, however, involved a legal question. In a libel
case there were two considerations; one of fact for the jury, and one of
law for the judge. The former limited the jury to a consideration of the
meaning of the clauses of the libel, and whether or not the indicted
person actually wrote the same. The question of law involved the deci-
sion as to the character of the document; was it a libel, or was it not.
In a majority of cases the latter question was, of course, the real sub-
ject of dispute, and thus the decision was really removed from the jury-
box to the Bench. Twelve men were called upon to consider whether a
man was guilty of the publication of a libel, and yet at the same time
they could not judge whether the publication was actually a libel or
whether its publication involved guilt. The jury was forbidden to look
at intentions, and yet as Junius writes: "in other criminal prosecu-
tions, the malice of the design is confessedly as much a subject of con-
-’
( 1 )
sideration to a jury as the certainty of the fact."
This doctrine was defended by Lord Mansfield, and was likewise
supported by a long succession of eminent lawyers. Holt, one of the
greatest of constitutional judges, and Sir Philip York© (Lord Hardwicke),
who was active in the prosecutions against the ’’Craftsman” under George
II, and Chief Justice Raymond all asserted this interpretation of the
libel law. The one great authority who believed that the decision of
the whole question rested with the jury was Lord Camden.
Among the cases which might be selected to show the contradictory
viewr on the libel doctrine there are none better known or clearer than
the case against the "North Briton"; the prosecution against the Junius
letters; the prosecution against the printers Woodfall, Miller and others
in 1771; and the trial of Stockdale. These cases not only illustrate
the doctrine of libel, but they mark the character of the progress which
the press made toward freedom during this period, for the "North Briton"
was one of the boldest papers and did not veil its sarcasms by assumed
names; the prosecution of the Junius letters revealed the difficulty
of convicting those held on libel charges; the case against the printers
established the security of Parliamentary reporting; and the trial of
Stockdale paved the way for the Libel Bill by practically establishing
the lawfulness of full and free discussion of government affairs.
To go into the details of these four cases would be a digression
hardly justified by the extent of this account, but a brief summary of
two may not be out of place. The trial connected with the publication
of the "Letters of Junius" is typical, showing at the same time the ap-
plication of the Libel Lav; and the spirit of the opposition to it. The
first letter under the signature of Junius appeared on Nov. 21, 1768,
(1) England in the XVIIIth Century—Lecky
.
Vol . III. p. 249.
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and from then on there appeared letters of an increasingly hold charac-
ter. The letters were published in the ’’Public Advertiser,” and attract
ed very wide attention. This was due mainly to two reasons; first, be-
cause of the very attractive style in which they were written. For con-
densed invective and forceful outspoken utterance they can hardly be sur
passed in English literature. Sharp sarcasm, statements both clear and
vivid, well chosen epigrams, finely constructed metaphors, and often
passages of imaginative beauty are found throughout the letters. The
writer had the gift of saying things that are easily remembered and
quotable-~a brilliant and striking style—which perfectly adapted his
writings to the purposes for which they were intended.
But if they commanded admiration because of their literary quali-
ties, there was a more potent reason to be found in the critical condi-
tion of the period which they exposed. In America there was a growing
discontent; Corsica had been seized by the French, Spain refused to pay
the Manila ransom, and the English had been expelled from the Falkland
Islands. These were humiliating conditions, indicating government in-
efficiency, and a policy fatal to imperial greatness. At home the en-
croachments on the rights of electors had raised indignation nearly to
revolution. Parliament and the law courts were discredited, ministers
were strong only in purchased majorities, and divided among themselves,
while the sovereign had lost his popularity. These conditions were
fatal to constitutional liberty. For opposition there remained only
the press and the jury-box. Thus the letters of Junius came at a most
critical time.
Excitement culminated in the letter to the King of Dec. 19, 1769.
Woodfall had published it, and A.lamon and Miller had reprinted it, and
they were accordingly prosecuted by the Attorney-General. The trial of
'1 • f
••
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Alamort came first, and the jury finding him guilty, he was sentenced to
pay a fine of ten marks, and to give security for his good behavior
during two years. Woodfall was next arraigned, and Mansfield argued his
position on the doctrine of libel, which position has previously been
stated. The jury responded by a verdict of ’’guilty of printing and pub-
lishing only.” After a long discussion the verdict was set asid6, and
a new trial was ordered. Meanwhile Miller was acquitted, and the tem-
per of the London juries was such that no attempt was made to renew the
prosecution of Woodfall . It was evident that public sentiment was sup-
porting the press, and the Annual Register of 1771 declared that ”a Lon-
( 1 )
don jury would hardly bring in a verdict against political libellers.”
The verdict in the Stockdale trial, 1789, established the impor-
tant doctrine that full and free discussion was lawful, and points natur-
ally to the culmination of this period of controversy over the Libel Law.
Stockdale was indicted by the Attorney-General, at the instance of the
House of Commons, for publishing a defense of Warren Hastings, written by
Rev. Mr. Logan. It was charged that the pamphlet was a seditious libel,
intending to vilify the House of Commons as corrupt and unjust during
the impeachment. Mr. Erskine, who defended the case, maintained that the
defendant was not to be judged by any isolated passages put together in
the information, but by the entire context—its general character and
object. He further maintained that the question was one which ’’cannot,
in commonsense, be anything resembling a question of lav;, but is a pure
question of fact.” Lord Kenyon who tried the case did not deny this
( 2 )
doctrine, and the jury returned the verdict of ’’not guilty.”
One may well now ask: ”What v;as the result and effect of these
(1) England in the XVIIIth Century—Lecky . Vol. III. p. 266
(2) Constitutional History of England—May . ” II. p. 119.
.1
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trials?” There were several, which space will permit only to mention.
First, there developed a fear and distrust of the doctrine of libel as
stated by Mansfield. Its dangers were quite apparent, and the public,
consequently, was only too ready to sympathize with those who opposed
it. Secondly, there was a wholesome belief that the rights of juries
were rights not to be restricted or lightly considered. Thirdly, both
within Parliament, and outside, men were expressing their ideas freely.
The freedom of the press was before the public, and in a very favorable
position. Lord Rockingham wrote to Dowdeswell, who had called for the
introduction of a bill into Parliament to settle doubts concerning rights
of jurors in libel cases: ”he who would really assist in re-establishing
and confirming the right in juries to judge of both law and fact, would
( 1 )
be the best friend to posterity."
The natural outcome of such a feeling was the Libel Bill of 1792.
Fox, who formerly upheld the Mansfield doctrine, had now faced about,
and the opinion within the House of Commons had so changed that when it
was suggested in 1791 that a bill be brought in to declare the law there
was scarcely any opposition. Mr. Fox accordinly brought in such a bill
supported by the Attorney-General and Mr. Pitt, and Lord Camden. It
passed the Commons, but was held up in the Lords by Lord Thurlow because
of the lateness of the session and the importance of the bill.
The following session, 1792, the bill passed Commons unanimously,
and supported by Lord Camden was pushed through the Lords, but against
a protest signed by Lord Thurlow, and five other Lords.
In form the Libel Law was declaratory, and in effect it was a re-
versal of the decision of judges by the High Court of Parliament. It
(1) Constitutional History of England—May . Vol. II. p. 118.
- -
.
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maintained the rights of juries, and secured the subject a fair trial by
his peers, but there was introduced no uncertainty into the law, nor any
dangerous indulgence. It served to remove the jealousy which existed be-
tween the jury and the bench, and there resulted a better protection
from attack than heretofore.
An extensive account of the development of the English press has
been given because in a very great degree the American press was involv-
ed. This was certainly the case until America ceased to be a colony,
and even after that time America was still largely influenced by Eng-
lish customs, ideas, and precedents. With this in mind the survey of
the growth of the freedom of the press in America may be made briefly.
During the first half of the eighteenth century Boston was the
press center of the colonies. The "News Letter” appeared in ApMl 1704,
and by 1735 there v^ere five newspapers published. The first printing
press was brought to Massachusetts in 1638 because of the attacks made
by Archbishop Laud against the Puritan press in England. This press was
directed by Kaward. In 1665 a private printing office was opened, and
in 1674 printing was permitted in Boston, but the General Court had
established a board of censors to keep the publications within limits.
The overthrcwal of the Massachusetts Bay Company placed the control
of printing into the hands of the crown. The instructions to Gov.
Andros of New England are typical of those sent to other Governors,
and were as follows regarding printing: "for as much as great incon-
veniences may arise by the liberty of printing within our said territory
under your government, you are to provide by all necessary orders that
no person keep any printing presses for printing, nor that any book,
pamphlet, or other matters whatsoever be printed without your especial
. e* ;
.
%leave and license first obtained." Commissions to this effect were
dropped after about 1730, and up to this time they were little heeded,
for the colonial assemblies refused to attach any penalty to the dis-
( 1 )
obedience of the Governor in this respect.
In 1721 Gov. Shut© of Massachusetts asked for penal legislation
against authors of seditious papers, but the House of Representatives
refused, and resolved instead that "to suffer no books to be printed
without a license from the Governor w ill be attended with unnumerable
inconveniences and danger."
The relationship between the Governor, as the representative of
royal authority, and the colonial assemblies was that of a constant
struggle. The question of provincial administration and rights was
always in agitation.
There were held two general principles which affected this relation-
ship; one as to the application of common law, and the other as to
statute law. Richard West, special counsel to the Board of Trade in
1720 declared that the common law of England was the common law of the
plantations: "let an Englishman go where he will, he carries as much of
law and liberty with him as the nature of things will bear," he declared.
Attorney-General Yorke in 1729 when dealing with the application of the
Statute Law in Maryland stated that general statutes enacted by Parlia-
ment since the settlement of the province (Maryland), and not expressly
applied to that colony, or to colonies in general were not applicable
there, unless declared so by act of assembly or "received there by long
uninterrupted usage or practice." This remained a disputed question.
Thus the colonies received the familiar safeguards granted in common law
such as: personal liberty, right of property, trial by jury; but religious
liberty and the right of free criticism of public men and measures were
(1) History of United States—Channing. Vol. II. p. 477.
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%not secured. The eighteenth century in America is a duplicate of the
same period in England as far as the freedom of the press is concerned.
It was a period of litigation during which the doctrine of libel was
( 1 )
|
settled.
The conteet in America could not become as acute or spectacular
as it did in England. The freedom of the press was gained sooner and
v/ith less commotion over here for perhaps two main reasons. First be-
cause of the temper and spirit of the colonial people—a condition which
greatly fostered democracy, and which in turn England was quite unable to
control. Secondly the comparative unimportance of the American press be-
fore the Revolution which rendered its progress of less moment than that
of the press in England. By 1750 there were newspapers published in
only seven colonies, and by 1775 there 7/ere only thirty-four with a total
weekly circulation of about five thousand copies. These were generally
imperfect in reports, giving considerable space to English nev/3 of court
and Parliament, literature, and essays. The editorial section had
hardly come to its own. Added to this was a scattered population, with
poor facilities for communication, and interested first in getting a
living. The town-meeting, and public assembly v/ere ready means of
protest, but the newspaper as yet had but a limited importance.
Thus it happens that press liberty was really gained fifty-soven
years earlier in America than in England, and its 7/hole development
was far less complex. The classic case which established the American
i
interpretation of the libel law was that concerning Peter Zenger in
1725, for here the jury broke away from the established custom of Eng-
land regarding the power of juries in libel cases.
(1) Provincial America--G-reene pp. 201 & 202.
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Zenger published the ’’Weekly Journal" in New York. The Governor
j
of the colony, Mr. Cosby had removed Mr. Lewis Morris, the chief justice,
because a case which involved the Governor's salary had been decided
against him. Zenger used the columns of his paper to publish a sharp
criticism of the Governor’s action. Libel Charges were brought against
Zenger, and the case was brought up before the new chief justice,
DeLancey. DeLancey maintained, consistent with the English opinion of
that time, that the jury could only decide on the fact of publication,
and simply accept the decision of the court as to the libellous chara-
cter of the statements made. This would of a certainty have convicted
Zenger, for DeLancey was already prejudiced against him. The lawyer
for the defense was Andrew Hamilton of Pennsylvania. He argued that
the jury must decide whether the publication was a false and malicious
libel; for public criticism, he maintained, was the only safeguard of
a free government. He maintained that the question was not the cause
of a poor printer, nor of New York alone; but the cause of liberty--
"the liberty of opposing arbitrary power by speaking and writing truth."
(l)Zenger was acquitted, and America established the principle in 1735
which England did not secure till 1792. Gouverneur Morris said of this
trial that it was "the morning star of that liberty which subsequently
revolutionized America" .( 1 ) It did make possible the quicker develop-
ment of the newspaper as a vehicle of instruction on constitutional
matters, and on questions between the colonies and England. Discussions
of assemblies, town-meetings, committees were more readily published,
and separation from England was possibly brought about sooner because of
the enlarged opportunities for the press to keep alive and give direction
(l) History of the United States - Charming Vol.II.pp 487-488.
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to the forces of liberty in America.
After the Revolution the liberty of the press was guaranteed in the
Constitution of the United States. The first amendment to the Constitu-
tion reads thus: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or* prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peace-
ably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances . "
The purpose of this rather extended discussion was to establish a
secure background for the question regarding the constitutionality of
the Alien and Sedition Acts. This survey will show that the use of the
press for the expression of opinion on public matters was the result of
no sudden agitation or temporary enactments, but has developed out of
the past as one of the soundest and most necessary rights which safe-
guard a free government. With these facts in mind it is easy to under-
stand hov/ the Republican party was able to rally to its standard a great
majority, to denounce Federal ligislation in the Virginia and Kentucky
resolutions, and to overwhelm the Federalist party in 1800 in the name
of and by virtue of the doubted constitutionality of the Alien and Sed-
ition Acts.
In looking at the Alien and Sedition Acts from the political view-
point it is necessary to consider the two events which form the polit-
ical background. The election of 1796 serves to intorduce the dominant
figures of the period, showing their views and political tendencies.
The quarrel with France—the all absorbing question--presents those is-
sues which were destined to divide the people of United States politi-
cally .
«.
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During the summer of 1796 Washington gave no evidences of his in-
tentions regarding a third term, and both Federalists and republicans
had chosen electors to support him had he decided to accept, but no
September 17 came his definite refusal in his Farewell Address. That
summer and fall were strenuous times. Kis withdrawal gave full oppor-
tunity for the display of party feeling, and allowed it to go unres-
trained by any dominating personality. Washington had been able to
lift the Presidency above party politics , -from now on it was to be a
party prize.
Gonstestants were immediately in the field: John Adams and Thomas
Pinckney for the Federalists party; and Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr
for the Republican party. Of these Adams was the favorite, and logical
choice. He had been serving his country 3ince 1775 with great distinct-
ion. He had just completed eight yoars in the Vice-Presidency, --an of-
fice then considered as a stepping stone to the Presidency. He had seen
service abroad, was intimately connected with American independence, in
fact the mover of the Declaration itself, and in every way was eminently
*
qualified for the office in so far as experience could prepare any man.
As a man, Adams, to his contemporaries, was characterized as one
"of great firmness; of a decisive independent manly character; of the
utmost integrity, and patriotism." He was held to be of aristocratic
tendencies, attached to the policy of Washington, a believer in the rule
of the "well born", and that the hewing of wood and drawing of water be-
longed to the "canaille multitude". The election of Adams would, it was
believed, commit the country to strict neutrality, to a support of the
Jay Treaty with Sngland, to an entrance into the war against France if
need be, to an indorsement of the United States Bank, and to a probable
(*
-
.
.
continued policy of increasing federal power through a loose construc-
( 1 )
tion of the Constitution.
Tile candidate of the Republican party for President was Jefferson.
He, too, had been in the service of his country since pre-Revolutionary
times. He had seen service- abroad, and like Adams was intimately as-
sociated with American independence. To his contemporaries he was a
man of much knowledge, especially philosophical and scientific. He has
been characterized thus by one writer: "no one will deny him the praise
of a considerable literary genius; and for his diplomatic writings he
has been greatly, and in some degree justly, commended". "But from his
public conduct, I take him to be of a weak, wavering, indecisive charac-
ter; deliberating when he ought to act, and frequently acting without
steadiness, judgment, or perseverance." "With this opinion of Mr. Jef-
ferson, I might think him fit to be a professor in a college. President
of a Philosophical Society, or even Secreatry of State; but certainly
( 2 )
not the first magistrate of a great nation." This view should, not
minimize an opinion of Jefferson’s abilities, however. He had a tremen-
dous hold on the people, and as a politician he has rarely had his equal.
With nothing of the spectacular of Hamilton, he yet exerted, through his
lieutenants, a magnetic influence which could enlist and hold together
men and popular feeling; he was in this respect far superior to Adams,
and this was no small factor in determining the ultimate result of their
political rivalry. The election of Jefferson meant the defying of
England, abrogating the Jay Treaty, yielding to the demands of the French
Directory, and a possible alliance with France. It meant a denunciation
of the Bank, and any other legislation which extended the national
(1) History of the People of United States—McMaster. Vol.II. p 296.
(2) Annual Report of the Amer. Hist. Association— 1913. Vol.II. (Let-
ters of R. G. Harper.)
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authority beyond those powers definitely stated in the Constitution.
The campaign was conducted very strenuously by both sides, and developed
into a sort of game between England and France for political advantage.
A Mr* R. G. Harper, writing from Philadelphia on Jan. 5, 1797, expressed
himself to this effect: "it is well known that the French were extremely
desirous of seeing Mr. Jefferson President; that they interested them-
selves to the utmost in favor of his election; that they made a great
point of his success. Had there been no other objection to him, this, in
my mind would have been quite sufficient. They must have been desirous
of his succeeding from one or two reasons; either because they thought
him so devoted to their interests as to enter readily and of his own
accord into all their views; or so weak, or vain, that it would be easy
for them to flatter or frighten him into such measures as they might wish
to see adopted. Probably they counted on both: either 'would render him
unfit for President of the United States, had he no other defect.” The
same writer in speaking of both England and France says: "they endeavor
to work on our passions; and if one of them should find in our country,
or in those who adminster our government, a violent hatred against its
rival, or a strong affection toward itself, it will not fail to lay hold
on those feelings in order to direct our counsels" . No doubt much of the
activity of the Republicans, exhibiting their extreme prejudices, grew
out of their hostility to the policy of the Federalist government which
had committed this country to strict neutrality in face of the Treaty
of 1778 with France, and then had seemed to aggravate the French sympathiz-
ers by the Jay Treaty with England. These treaties could well be in-
cluded as part of the campaign material in 1796, but have been reserved
I
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for discussion in connection with the French quarrel-- to he considered
from the foreign, rather than from the domestic, standpoint.
Another factor which had a hearing on the election was exerted hy
the "Democratic Clubs"
. They tended to keep alive opposition to the
Federalists, and to foster Republican sentiment wherever possible. They
were not without their bad effects, for their violent partisanship often
carried them to extremes which were injurious to their cause.
Within the Federalist party, however, there was something more dang-
erous and more to be feared than the violent partisan spirit which chara-
cterized the Republicans. It was a factional spirit directed by no less
a manager than Alexander Hamilton. It fortunately did not make itself
severely felt at this time, but it proved to be the seed of that discord
which eventually so undermined Adams’ adminstrat ion that the Federalist
party could not hold together. The reasons for Hamilton’s antipathy are
vague and uncertain. His temperament, his impulsiveness, and love for
publicity and honor must have made him, as such natures have often been,
susceptible to jealousy. Endowed with abilities of the first rank, the
real statesman of Washington’s cabinet, and leader of his party, he was
yet obliged to stand by and watch ethers get the highest prizes. It ha.s
been held, too, that his was a nature that could not endure the loss of
influence which would follow should Adams be elected. With Washington,
Hamilton was supreme in his influence, with Adams it would not be so.
But this is more or less a speculation. Whatever may have been the reas-
ons, the fact remains that a formidable faction took root within the Fed-
eralist party.
When it appeared that Adams, through his position of Vice-Fresident,
I
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and because of his strong New England support was sure to be a candidate
of the Federalists, Hamilton devised a scheme to defeat him by electing
his running mate. For a man to run with Adams, Hamilton looked to the
South. He tried Patrick Henry who refused. He then turned to Thomas
Pinckney, of South Carolina, who was at that time popular because of the
•Spanish Treaty he had just negotiated, and Pinckney accepted the honor.
The plan was to have the two candidates before the people for election,
but when the electoral college met Hamilton's friends were to refuse to
vote for Adams, which would result in the election of Pinckney.
A scheme of such proportions could not be completely disguised, and
Jefferson, either to throw a brand into the Federal camp, or to offer a
show of friendship for Adams, wrote him: "it is possible, indeed, that
even you may be cheated of your succession by a trick worthy of the sub-
( 1 )
tlety of your arch friend of New York" . Hamilton is said to have re-
marked afterward: "it is true that a faithful execution of this plan
would have given Mr. Pinckney a somewhat better chance than Mr. Adams,
nor shall it be concealed that such an issue would not have been disa-
greeable to me, as indeed I declared ta the time in the circle of my
(2)
confidential friends" .
To insure against the success of Hamilton's plan the New England
electors stood firmly by their first candidate, and threw away on their
second. This Pinckney ran equal with Adams in Vermont, New York, New
Jersey, Delaware; gained eight votes in South Carolina, (his home state)
and one in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut.
This resulted in the election of Jefferson as Vice-President, —a very
curious situation, and one which could not be avoided under a system
(l) Adminstration of Washington and Adams- -Gibbs
.
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v - ) S tate ..rials—Vharton (Preliminary Notes - n 11)
..
'
.
i :f
‘
: m w . ' . •:
.
’j
:
.
'
1
i ’&
whereby the electors did not vote for one man as President, and another
as Vice-President, hut each elector voted for two persons, the highest
of whom, provided he had a majority, became President, and the second
became Vice-President.
That the election was not wholly characterized by a spirit which
the above might lead one to expect may be seen in the following from
Mr. Jefferson to Mr. Adams: "that your admins trat ion may be filled with
glory and happiness to yourself, and advantage to us, is the sincere
prayer of one who, though in the course of our voyage, various little
incidents have happened or been contrived to separate us, yet retains
for you the solid esteem of the times when we were working for our in-
CD
dependence, and sentiments of sincere respect and attachment.
The second main feature in the political background of the Alien
and Sedition Laws is the quarrel with France. England and France were
in the midst of a struggle for supremacy in Europe- -a struggle in which
the mastery of the sea played a large part. The United States remained
the only important nation which could uphold its neutrality, but in so
doing the country was torn by contrary claims, and became a sort of sec-
ond battleground where each side contested for the first place in our
political affection. We were attracted to France because she was in
need, and had but recently helped us when we were in similar circumstanc-
es. With her cause we sympathized, but her aggressive policy of priv-
ateening, and her threatening attitude in starting a line of forts on
the Gulf of Mexico alienated that affection to a certain extent.
As for England, it was our old home; its language, customs, law3,
traditions were very much ours as well. England, too, was intimately
associated with us in trade but the manner in which she held on to west-
(1) Administration of Washington and Adams—Gibbs
. Vol. I. : . 45c
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era furposts, and ransacked our vessels for supposed deserters was ob-
jectionable .
Our relationship to France was expressed in the Treaty of 1778,
drawn up by the Colonies in revolt, with the Eourbon government of France
The treaty was in effect a defensive and offensive alliance for the dur-
ation of the war then just begun, and placed upon the United i-tates the
obligation of reciprocal help to the extent of protecting the French
West Indies should a necessity of this sort ever arise. During the lat-
ter part of Washington’s administration the necessity came, and the Un-
ited states government was confronted with a delicate situation. To
avoid the Treaty would be a very, very much, and perhaps justly, criti-
cised act; but to go to \ ar with England, who controlled the seas, would
mean commercial ruin for us.
The weight of the arguments, together with expediency, seemed to
support neutrality-^, policy which Washington and Adams both success-
fully maintained. -It was pointed out that a Treaty made with the Bour-
don government put us under no obligations to the government which was
responsible for the overthrow of the Bourbon authority, end besides tin
excesses of the revolutionary government of France inspired but very lit-
tle confidence in either its estability or dependableness. In addition
England controlled the seas and held the key to our north-west territory;
and Spain, her ally, threatened our southern and south-western frontiers-
a condition which would somewhat embarass us should we decide in favor
of France*
Having decided that neutrality must be the policy of the United
i
States Washington sent Jay to England to clear up, if possible, the
situation between the two countries. The result was the celebrated Jay
._
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Treaty—confirmed by the Senate, June 24, 17S5. The Treaty provided for
the evacuation of the northwestern posts by the British; for the payment
of debts due the subjects of each country; defined contraband; regulated
privateening; and the trade privileges with England and East Indies were
extended, but those with West Indies were restricted. But the Treaty
did not prevent the impressment of American sailors; it did not provide
any settlement for the many slaves taken away by the British armies at
the close of the Revolutionary War; and it did not guarantee any change
in the arbitrary policy of England regarding neutral trade with France*
It was believed, however, by the authors, Jay and Bord Grenville, that
the Treaty 'would bo acceptable, and indeed was made in a spirit of
friendliness and toleration by both parties. But when the contents
were made public in July, there arose a fierce storm of protest. Madis-
on said that the "treaty from one end to the other must be regarded as
a demonstration that the party to which the envoy belongs is a British
government". "Damn John Jay’. Damn everyone that won’t damn John Jay*.
Damn everyone that' won't put lights in his windows and sit up all night
a)
damning John Jay" was a sentiment heartily approved of.
A large part of this disapproval was because movements of passion
are quicker than those of understanding . People did not stop to think.
They did not appear to consider that our trade was nearly all with Eng-
land, which in war would be ruined; that we had no army or navy; that
we had but little money, and that even the purses of Europe at that time
were shut to us. It was war or treaty, and Jay went to England not to
engage in a "trial of diplomatic fencing." Eis object was peace, and
(l) History of American People
—
Wilson. Vol. Ill p. 140.
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he felt that he had gained enough for that. Yot the country seemed ang-
ry that he had not failed; as John Adams wrote, "you cannot imagine what
(1)
horror some persons are in lest peace should continue.”
Washington hesitated, and sought advice before accepting the treaty--
the alternative was peace or war. True to his judgment, he "chose stead-
ily and firmly, as i'f there had been no clamor."
Slowly the storm blew over, trade quickened, debts were adjusted,
I
and awards made, and the firmness and prudence of Jay, and the adminis-
tration which supported him began to dawn upon the people.
But if the Jay Treaty had brightened the British horizon, the
French horizon had perceptibly darkened. On March 4, 1797, John Adams
had become Fresident and he inherited from the preceding administrations
the conditions above explained, but with an aggravated French situation-
due to the Jay Treaty, and the conduct of our minister, ' onroe, in Paris.
In 1794, Washington sent Monroe to France to take the place of Gouverneur
I Morris, who was disliked because of his anti-republican prejudices, and
who as a result, lacked the confidence of the French government. Monroe
,
on the other hand, was an ardent supporter of republicanism. The in-
structions which he carried with him conveyed the idea that Jay Yiras not
to make a commercial treaty with England, and acting on this assumption
he allowed his republican enthusiasm to assert itself in a manner that
quite misled the French as to the real meaning of the Jay mission. It
was probably not intended that Monroe’s republicanism should serve as a
screen to beguile the French while they were being outwitted across the
channel. In fact, Monroe was given a mild censure, and politely inform-
ed that his 'mission did not call for such conspicuous demonstrations.
(l) History of the American People—Jilson. Vol. III. P» -1 '
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But the facts remained the same: France believed she had been tricked,
and Monroe believed he had been imposed upon. Monroe’s conduct contin-
ued displeasing to Washington, and in December, 1796, Charles C. Pinck-
ney arrived in Paris as Monroe's successor.
During the previous October France had come under the control of
the Directory, and the new government adopted a hostile policy toward
America. This policy was doubtless adopted for several reasons: Adams
had been elected President in 1796 and France expected but little
sympathy from him, for by his acts and declarations he was pledged
to the general policy of Washington; and secondly, the recent successes
of Napoleon in Austrian Lombardy had raised the enthusiasm and confidence
of the French government. Accordingly, Mr. Pinckney was given his pass-
ports after two months of unofficial life in Paris, and in August, the
French minister to the United States, Adet, was recalled.
The crisis called for unusual action, and on May 15, 1797, a spec-
ial session of Congress was called. Adams' opening message met with ap-
proval: he attacked the attempt of French diplomacy to separate the
affections of the American people from their government, and declared
that "such attempts ought to be repelled with a decision which shall
convince France and the world that we are not a degraded people, humil-
iated under a colonial spirit of fear and sense of inferiority, fitted
to be the miserable instruments of foreign influence, and regardless of
national honor, character, and interest." He expressed the intention
of sending a new mission to France, but recommended measures of defense,
especially a naval force. The whole tone of the message was firm, and
expressed the conviction that United States had been just and impartial
(1)
in its conduct.
(1) History of the United States—Schouler
. Vol.X. i
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There was a Federalist majority in both houses of Congress- The
Senate was decidedly Federalist, while the House was divided into three
groups: the extreme Federalist led by William Smith and Harper who were
ready for war, and who were supported in the Cabinet by Pickering and
Wolcott. The Republicans, who believed that the situation was not
dangerous, and that if it were, it was due only to Federalist mismanage-
ment. Thirdly, there was a group of moderate men who usually acted with
the Federalists; whom Jefferson called "a few individuals, of no fixed
system at all, governed by the panic or prowess of the moment; flap, as
the breeze blows, against the Republican or aristocratic bodies, and give
( 1 )
to the one or the other a preponderance entirely accidental." This
Congress passed measures looking to the national defense, acted in accord
with Adams’ recommendations, and adjourned July 8, 1797.
In the meantime a new commission to France had been appointed con-
sisting of Pinckney, Marshall, and Cerry, and France had become openly
hostile. She seemed bent on chastising Americans into a revocation of
the treaty with England. American vessels having British property on
board were seized; and the French courts in the West Indies were strong-
ly biased in their decisions. As a pretext for seizure an old laxv was
revived which permitted the capture of a vessel which failed to carry an
official list of its crew.
But this action on the part of France only served to injure her
cause. The people of the United States were growing wearied of the
"unrequitted service" pleas, and her hysterical reproaches. There was
a growing feeling that United States and France no longer had a common
(1) History of the United States--Schouler . (Quoted by Schouler )Vol . I . p.353
,
interest. The illusion of "fraternity" and the "rights of man" was
dissolving. This new drift of public feeling tended to band citizens
together, and there was a oloser approach of parties on the French
issue. Jefferson was quick to discern the tendency; he remarked, "I
can scarcely withhold myself from joining in the wish of Silas Deane,
( 1 )
that there were an ocean of fire between us and the Old World."
It is true that the turn in the French situation ’was bound to have
a very positive effect on domestic politics
,
--an effect which men, less
keen than Jefferson, could see would work injury to the Republican party
and serve to strengthen and unify the Federalist. The policy of the
Federalist was upholding well the national honor, and in the face of a
common danger it would bo triumphant, for American politics have a
faculty of ending at the waters’ edge*
But there were many who held Adams responsible for the condition,
\
many who were disappointed to find him a party man in spite of his in-
augural address, and many who distrusted absolutely the Federalist party.
This opposition not only expressed itself through the recognized party
channels, but employed a bitter and partisan press to spread its views
before the public. The situation was further aggravated by the presence
in this country of some thirty thousand French residents, and some fif-
ty thousand British who at heart were loyal to their respective count-
ries, and also by the recent arrival in this country of certain foreign-
ers with opinions so radical that their heme governments refused to tol-
erate them. There were, therefore, two outstanding features in the
American Political situation when Congress was called together in regular
session, November 13, 1707; first a bitter party feeling, which Adams’
(1) History of the United States—Schouler. Vol j „
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porsonality had been unable to dominate, expressed through a press not
only malignant, but under the influence of radical foreigners; and
secondly, a foreign situation such that a favorable turn would give
to the Federalists great power-- a power which used properly would secure
for the party a position of undisputed political influence in the United
States, but misused would perhaps lead to its downfall.
The three envoys, Pinckney, Marshall, and Gerry, arrived in Paris
in October, 1797, but only to be told by Talleyrand, the French minister
of foreign affairs, that the Directory had taken exceptions to the
President’s speech on the opening of Congress, and felt therefore that
it could not receive them openly. The commission was informed, however,
that a payment, of tribute to France for pact insults would go a long
way toward adjusting matters, and probably gain for the commissioners
an official reception. The whole deal was so underhanded and unbecom-
ing of the great French nation that the Americans could hardly attach
any truth to it. But when they were assured of its validity, they treat-
ed the proposition with admirable contempt and dignity; the American
answer being, "millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute."
In the meantime the leaders had been informed by Adams of the
probable failure of the mission to France, and Congress had been advised
to pass adequate defense measures. The publication of this news pro-
duced great excitement; Federalists becoming enthusiastic and ready to
urge forward their defense measures with vigour; while of the Republicans,
some were amazed, while others gave expression to their suspicions and
distrust of the Federalist admins trat ion. This latter class included
those who felt convinced that the Federalist program was but a party
plan, to bring United States into the war, and thereby strengthen the
(w
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contral government for their own benefit. A resolution was introduced
into the Pennsylvania legislature on March 20 expressing a disapproval
of commencing hostilities against a people "with whom their hearts
and hands have been so lately united in friendship." On March 27,
Spriggs of Maryland offered in the national House three extreme
resolutions (1) that it was inexpedient under existing circumstances
to resort to war against the French Republic; (2) that arming merchant
vessels ought to be restricted; (3) that adequate protection for our
seacoast and for internal defense should be provided. A debate
immediately followed between the Federalists and Republicans which
was full of personalities. The sincerity of the administration seemed
to be doubted, as well as the reality of an emergency as great as had
been represented, and the Federalists determined to expose the full
proceedings of the American commissioners in Paris. On April 3,
Congress received the complete reports, excepting the names of
Talleyrand’s unofficial agents, who were designated as X.Y.Z.
The result of the X. Y. Z. exposure was a complete triumph for
the Federalists. The conduct of the American Commissioners was in-
spiring, and the patience, calmness and justness of the administration
won for it unbounded support and enthusiasm. The doubtful members of
Congress went over to the President’s side. Speaker Dayton among them.
Two-thirds of the Senate, and a decided majority in the House were
now united in support of the administration. The Republicans were
completely humbled, and reduced "to a more feeble minority throughout
the nation than they had been any day before since their first
(
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( 1 )
organization as a party."
Measure after measure was now passed in preparation for war.
Provisions were made for fortifying coast towns, and for protecting
navigation. A navy department was put into operation with Benjamin
Stoddart as Secretary; and the President was authorized to increase
our fleet. Bills were enacted for the purchase of arms, cannon, and
military stores. In May an army was authorized, and in July, Washing-
ton was appointed commander-in-chief, with Hamilton second in command.
In June, a law was passed suspending commercial relations with France
after July 1. To defray expenses a loan was authorized, and a direct
tax was laid on real estate. The whole session was one of boldness
and activity.
The country also exhibited the same energy and spirit. Everyone
knew "Hail Columbia" and Adams and Liberty, " songs composed at this
time which rang with enthusiasm for defense against an enemy.
Patriotic services were held everywhere, and addresses and petitions
expressing full sympathy with the administration were broadcoast.
Patriotism was fostered by military organizations, and men were eager
to enlist, and to give evidence of their loyalty to the land for ’which
their fathers had fought and died.
On the wave of this enthusiasm, secure in Congress and with the
people, the Federalist party made the fatal blunder of passing three
measures which manifestly operated directly, and almost exclusively,
upon its political opponents. The time had come in which to punish the
malignant Republican spokesmen.
(1) Constitutional History of United States—Von Holst. Vol. I. p. 141.
(jb4
The three measures were a Naturalization Law, and the Alien and
Sedition Laws. The Naturalization Lav/ of 1795 required a residence
here of five years. The new law, passed June 18, 1798, required a
residence of fourteen years. Although the law did not apply to those
aliens already within the country, it v/as nevertheless a stringent
law. It v/as repealed in 1802.
The Alien Law of July 6, 1798, applied to foreigners under the
two different conditions of peace and ware. In time of peace the
President v/as empowered by the law to expel from the country any alien
thought to be dangerous, or suspected of plotting against the govern-
ment. Disobedience was punished by a three year imprisonment term,
and the offender was liable to imprisonment at the will of the
President, should he return before his time of exile had expired. In
time of v/ar the President was given pov/er to arrest, imprison, or banish
all enemy aliens who might be deemed dangerous. The law was to be en-
forced for two years.
The Sedition Law, passed July 14, 1798, applied to Sedition acts
and seditious writings. To combine or to conspire unlawfully to
oppose government measures, or to prevent an officer from doing his
duty, or in the words of the act: "to commit, advise, or attempt to
procure any insurrection, riot, or unlawful assembly, or combination"
j
was made an offense punishable by a fine not exceeding $5000, and by
imprisonment not exceeding five years. The writing of false and
malicious articles against the government, or its officers, with in-
tent to defame or bring them into disrepute and excite against them
th.9 people of the United States, was made a crime punishable by a fine
c c
.
. i T Z
'
.
'
.
I'
-36-
of not more than $2000, and by imprisonment for not longer than two
years. The accused was allowed a trial and the privilege of proving
the truth of the statements charged against him, but in this case a
careful investigation only was accepted as a reasonable defence, and
he could not summon any officers of the government, nor demand the
public documents for his use.
- At the time the Laws were passed there seems to have been but
little opposition to them. In the House, to be sure, the vote was close
but in the Senate there was no opposition of any weight. Many of the
prominent Federalists did not consider them as unconstitutional, and
nearly all agreed as to their expediency. Among the cooler heads,
however, there were doubts. On June 26, 1798, Lloyd of Maryland in-
troduced a bill which embodied the principles soon after incorporated
into the Sedition Act. Hamilton expressed the following opinion of
it to Wolcott: "There are provisions in this bill which, according to
a cursory view, appear to me highly exceptionable, and such as more
than anything else may endanger civil war. I hope sincerely the thing
may not be hurried through. Let us not establish a tyranny. Energy
is a very different thing from violence. If xve make no false step,
we shall be essentially united; but if we push things to an extreme.
( 1 )
we shall then give to faction body and solidity."
The soundness of this advice is borne out by later events, and
(1) Constitutional History of United Stated--Von Holst (quoted by Von
Holst) Vol. I. p. 142
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there is reason to believe that Adams, Wolcott, and Pinckney felt
somewhat the same way as Hamilton did.
But the Federalist party as a whole was carried away by the en-
thusiasm of the hour; Federalist policies were right; Republican policies
were wrong; and France was hostile. To the Federalists it seemed that
the enemy at home must be controlled as well as the enemy abroad, and
he must be restrained from throwing any obstacles in the way of the
( 1 )
administration. Thus the Sedition Act was at one and the same time a
measure of national defense, and a weapon against a malicious political
enemy. Its former character was argued before the House. Members
believed "it was most particularly their duty to concert measures of
defense and protection” in the critical situation of affairs, and that
the "business of defense would be very imperfectedly done, if the
( 2 )
operations of defense were confined to land and naval forces.” They
believed it just as necessary "to destroy the cankerworm which is
(3)
corroding in the heart of the country.” Mr. Otis, of the House,
did not desire "to boggle about slight forms, nor to pay respect to
treaties already abrogated, but to seize those persons wherever they
could be found carrying on their vile purposes. Without this, every-
thing else which had been done in the way of defense would amount to
nothing.
"
(1) Von Holst; Constitutional History of United States. Vol. I. p 142
(2) Mr. Sitgreaves; Annals of Congress. 5th Congress ; 2nd session.
(3) Mr. Otis; " " "
( <
I
To these Federalists France appeared to have an organized system of
i conduct toward foreign nations, to bring them within her influence and
they felt that the Alien and Sedition Acts formed a necessary part of
a)
the precautionary and protective measures adopted for the security of
the United States. Gallatin, speaking for the Republicans, said that
he believed it to be a sound principle that alien enemies could be re-
moved—a principle existing before the Constitution and in harmony with
the lav/ of nations; but with him the question was as to when foreign
( 2 )
citizens become alien enemies.
If, however, the Alien, and Sedition Lav/s were passed ostensibly as
a part of the defensive measures which were hastened through Congress
during the spring and summer of 1798, it is nevertheless true that the
enforcement of the Sedition Law revealed their partisan purpose and
doubtful constitutionality in a conspicuous way. The Alien Law was nev-
er enforced by Adams, and the first part of the Sedition Law— that per-
taining to seditious acts—was never seriously objected to by anyone,
but when that part of the Sedition Law which dealt with seditious and
libellous writings was applied there arose a storm of protest. There
were many who sincerely believed that part of the law to be unconstitu-
j
tional, and a violation of the liberty of the press. And it is a sig-
nificant fact that Republican leaders were able to make political cap-
ital out of this belief by encouraging and spreading discontent. This
discontent grew in volume and intensity till it became a great factor in
the defeat of the Federalists in 1800. What, therefore, were the great
objections which people had to the Alien and Sedition Lav/s that the Re-
(1) Report of Bouse Committe. Feb. 25, 1799--AMR. State Papers —Lise . I.
(2) Gallatin: Annals cf Congress. 5th Congress; 2nd Session. May, 1798.
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publicans could thus utilize in their campaign; and secondly, what de-
fense could the Federalists offer?
First, with regard to the Alien Law.
The Republicans contended that the law denied trial by jury, and
thus claimed that provision of the Constitution which guarantees a trial
by jury for all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, had been viola-
ted. This law invested the President with power to send aliens away on
( 1 )
his own suspicion--a punishment without a trial by jury.
In the second place, it was contended that the lav; was unconstitu-
I
tional because in the first article and the ninth section of the consti-
tution migration or importation of such persons as any of the states
( 2 )
thought proper to admit was guaranteed till the year 1808.
And thirdly, the law against aliens was considered as a wrong pol-
icy, and too harsh. The rigor of the law was such that the desirable
and well-to-do immigrant would stop coming here--a situation to be lam-
ented in that there was much uncultivated land, the foreign element con-
tributed v/ealth, and the State legislatures had thought proper to offer
(3)
no hindrances to this influx of desirable foreigners heretofore.
The Federalists had answers to these objections.
In answer to the first, that the Alien Law denied trial by jury,
they maintained that the Constitution was made for citizens, and not for
aliens; that aliens enjoyed the laws not by right, but by favor and uer-
(4)
j
mission. Secondly, that the provisions of the Constitution relative to
"presentment and trial of offenses by juries" did not apply to the re-
(1) American State Papers. Misc. 1.
(2) Amer. State Papers. Misc 1.
(3) "Independent Chronicle"— January, 1799.
(4) Amer. State Papers. Misc. I.
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vocation of an asylum given to aliens. Thos provisions respected only
crimes, and they maintained that an alien might be removed without hav-
ing committed any crime for the sake of security, whereas a citizen had
a right to remain, and could not be disfranchised except for offences
( 1 )
first ascertained, on presentment and trial by jury. The Federalists
maintained that the removal of an alien was not a punishment inflicted
for an offense, but from motives of general safety. The law permitted
the removal "of an indulgence ’which there is danger of abusing, and
( 2 )
which we are in no manner bound to grant or continue."
In answer to the second objection, that the Alien Law violated the
first article and the ninth section of the Constitution, the Federalists
said that this section applied only to slaves for two reasons: (1) be-
cause the restriction applied only to the states in existence when the
Constitution was adopted, and (2) because the restriction continue only
twenty years, for which modification there could net have been the least
reason, had it applied to all emigrants. The Federalists further con-
tested that "to prevent emigration in general is a very different thing
from sending off, after their arrival, such emigrants as might render
themselves dangerous to the peace or safety of the country." An inter-
pretation of the section as the Republicans gave, they said, would pre-
vent Congress "from driving a body of armed men from the country, who
(3)
might land with views evidently hostile." The Federalists maintained
that if the federal government were denied the right to remove danger-
ous aliens there would be no authority in the country to do so—a prop-
(4)
osition which could not be admitted with reason or safety.
( 1 ) Amer .
( 2 )
(3)
(4)
State Papers. Misc.
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Turning to the Sedition Law, one finds the Republican attack pore
formidable
.
They maintained in the first place that the Sedition Law was un-
constitutional because Congress in passing it had exceeded the rights
expressly given to it by the Constitution. All power not so given was
reserved for the states or people. They held that the clause: "Con-
gress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers," under which
grant of power the Sedition Law was passed, was only an auxiliary to the
enumerated powers, and not an extra grant of power only in so far as it
( 1 )
operated to maintain the "foregoing powers."
The Republicans again believed that the Sedition Lav; was contrary
to that part of the Constitution which declares that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof, or abridging the liberty of the press". They
( 2 )
maintained that the law gave absolute power over the press. Any law
which threatened the loss of rights sc dearly won was sure to create
great excitement in a country such as this where the circulation of op-
inions, and a free discussion of public measures and men was essential
to a sound management of the government. As Cooper said in his trial,
the law is unsound because under its operation "the press is open to
those who will praise, while the threats of the law hang over those who
(3)
blame the conduct of the men in power" . This was fundamently opposite
to the convictions of the people regarding the liberty of the press.
The Republicans in the third place objected to the Sedition Lav;
( 1 )
( 2 )
(3)
Nicholas: Annals of Congress. 5th Congress; 3rd session.
n ii it it it Li ti it
Cooper’s speech quoted in State Trials--Wharton.
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because its operation was unjust. To them, the lav/ was enforced by jud-
ges, juries, and marshals, all of whom were the instruments of the party
( 1 )
^
attacked, either directly or indirectly. There was no uniform rule in
force in the United States courts for the selection of jurors. The law
declared that they were to be chosen according to the custom within the
several states. In New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, New Jersey, and
Virginia the marshals accordingly selected the jurors--thus exposing
( 2 )
the system to the cry of "packed juries". The vigor which some of the
judges, especially Judge Chase, exhibited in the disposal of sedition
cases only served to aggravate the Republican prejudices. The bench to
Chase became the scene for displays of party zeal. The enforcement of
the Sedition Law became a partisan affair in the minds of the Republicans.
The Republicans further maintained that the states were fully com-
petent to deal with cases involving private injury from defamation.
Nicholas in the House said: "It is to them (states) that our officers
must look for protection of persons, estates, and every other personal
right; and therefore, I see no reason why it is not proper to rely upon
( 3 )
it, for defense against private libels."
Again, the law was said to have a sort of English character. There
were those who saw in England a hereditary king who could do no wrong,
surrounded by officers who derived much of his inviolability in theory
at least, and the lav/ to them seemed to thus protect the President and
his officers, v/hose acts could not be seriously condemned. Cooper, in
(1) State Trials --Wharton. (Cooper Case)
(2) History of the People of United States—McMaster ; Vol. II. P, 472 & 473
(3) Nicholas—Annals of Congress. 5th Congress; 3rd Session.
<•
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his defense, remarked: "I know that in England the King can do no wrong
but I did not know till now that the President of the United States had
( 1 )
the same attribute." They believed this dangerous to the fundamental
conception of government in United States—that public officers are pub-
lic servants, responsible to the people, and subject to thsir election.
The Republicans also claimed that the government of the United
States was in principle much like a business corporation, and that the
Sedition Law failed to recognize the fact. The Independent Chronicle
of Boston, published in January, 1799, states the following:
"After such societies are formed, would it, or would it not, be
considered by every rational man to be preposterous, oppressive, ruinous,
and unjust, and a violation of the mutual rights of men, to pass laws
with heavy and severe penalties, prohibiting the several members of such
societies to complain of, remonstrate against, and even to reprobate the
conduct of the servants and agents of their respective corporations and
companies?" "Deprived of this right, what rational and effectual means
can there be left to such societies for reforming abuses and corruptions
( 2 )
to which all human sociesties are liable at least?"
Other contentions of the Republicans were that the Laws were hur-
ried through Congress; that the condition of affairs did not justify
such measures; that they established dangerous precedents; and that
they rendered one open to attack from any informer, necessitated in many
cases a trial in a distant court, incurring great expense without grant-
(3)
ing any indemnity.
(1) State Trials—Wharton.
(2) Independent Chronicle—January
,
1799.
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In short, the Sedition Law was un-American, directly opnosed to
the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Its obstinate enforcement
by the Federalist leaders was most unwise, for "republicans, like re-
ligion, was an inherent faculty in the breasts" of American citizens,
and the liberty of the press they considered as their birth-right, and
no party, however elevated in power, could denrive them of this privi-
( 1 )
lege with impunity.
The Federalists defended themselves from these attacks by explain-
int the view they took of the laws. In answer to the first charge, that
the Sedition Law required the exercise of a power not delegated to con-
gress, and was therefore unconstitutional
,
they maintained that in this
emergency precedents only were followed. It was pointed out that con-
gress had before passed laws not expressly provided for by the Consti-
tution, namely; an act for punishing certain crimes against the United
States; laws concerning piracy; acts for punishing those who commit per-
jury in any United States court, attempt to bribe judges, or to falsify
the record of any court of the United States, or to obstruct or resist
the process of any court of the United States. These were provisions
not expressly authorized, but considered constitutional because neces-
sary to the proper carrying out of certain powers which had been defin-
( 2 )
itely given to Congress.
In answer to the charge that the Sedition Law destroyed the liber-
ty of the press the Federalists defined "liberty of the press" as they
understood the term. In the first place, "liberty" consisted in permis-
sion to publish, without previous restraint, but subject to punishment
(1) Independent Chronicle--May 1799.
(2) American State Papers. Misc. I.
<(
.
,
I( 1 )
afterwards for improper publications." In the Socond place, "Liberty"
was not a license to publish anything, but only what was held proper, and
a writer was considered always answerable to the public and to individ-
uals for any abuse. In like manner they maintained that liberty of
speech did not permit slander, nor did liberty of action justify violence.
Again it was maintained that "liberty of the press" according to the law
of any state, United States, or England never did include false and mal-
icious writings against the government, or its officers, with an intent
to do mischief. A law to punish such is not an abridgment of "liberty",
for it would be a manifest absurdity to say that a man’s liberty was a-
bridged by punishing him for doing that which he never had a liberty to
( 2 )
do. The Federalists further maintains that the Sedition Law was not
unconstitutional because it made nothing pwnal that was not so before.
It gave no new powers to the courts, but was merely declaratory of the
Common Law. Writings with intent to do mischief were punishable at com-
mon law, and the act instead of extending the law and the power of the
court rather abridged both. The liberty of the press, they argued, had
been increased, for at common lav; libels against the government might be
punishable with fine and imprisonment at the courts’ discretion, but
this act limited the fine to ;2000, and the imprisonment to two years,
and it also allowed the defendant to offer the truth in evidence for his
defense, which by common law was expressly forbidden. The Federalists
also maintained that the law was not contrary to the constitution be-
cause it did not "abridge" the liberty of the press. The wording of the
first amendment to the Constitution permitted of "no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,"
(1) Amer. State Papers. Mi sc. I.
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and the Federalists held that had the same intention prevailed respect-
ing the press, the 3ame or similar wording would have been used. But
by the words used the prohibition extended only to an "abridgment "
,
and
thus laws might be passed respecting the press, provided they did not
"abridge" its liberty. The Sedition Law they maintained was no abridg-
( 1 )
ment, and consequently was not unconstitutional.
From the foregoing discussion of the contrary views of the Alien
and Sedition Laws it can readily be seen that the Republicans had the
arguments which would appeal to the rank and file of the plain American
people. The majority of the people could not reason on the constitu-
tionality of a law and come to a sound legal conclusion, but the "lib-
erty of the press" was to them a very definite thing which they did under-
stand.
It was also quite apparent to the average person that all of the
recent laws passed by the federalists greatly strengthened the central
authority and weakened the state authority.
The conception which most people had inherited from Revolutionary
days with respect to the relative powers of the state and federal govern-
ments would have to change should the centralizing influences continue.
In view of what was taking pla.ce a great many believed that the Federal-
ist party--a party of aristocratic and monarchial tendencies—fully in-
tended to undo the progress which had been made toward equality and in-
dividual liberty and to create within this country a government with
extensive and arbitrary powers not unlike that of England. The differ-
(1) Amer. State papers. Misc. I.
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©nce between Republicans and Federalism to them was no less a matter
than the difference between progress and reaction, between what France
stood for and what England was fighting to prevent. And this funda-
mental conception is the paramount factor in nearly all of the poli-
tical activity of the period. To the Republicans it was "the liberty of
the press"; to the Federalist the same press was licentious. A stand-
ing army, and an increased navy to one side was a threat; to the other
side, a protection. Democracy was in a transitional stage, not only
here, but in England and France as well, and as a result men lacked
confidence in each other.
Misapprehension of the intent of the Federalists was increased when
men compared the activity of their party with the reactionary measures
of the Tory party in England. There was a striking parallel-both part-
ies seemed to be aiming at the same thing. In November, 1795, a Treas-
onable Practices Bill 'was passed; likewise the same month a Seditious
Meetings Bill. Both bills were passed in spite of remonstrances from
parliament members and large classes of people outside, but the higher
classes generally supported the government in these regressive neas-
( 1 )
ures. Meetings were likewise held protesting that the bills struck at
the liberty of the press, and the freedom of public discussion-~but
with iio results. During this period the regulation of newspapers was
often considered by Parliament: the stamp and advertisement duties were
increased, more stringent provisions were made against unstamped pub-
lications, and securities were taken for securing the responsibility of
printers. In April, 1799, a Corresponding Societies Bill was passed
which was an extreme measure; suppressing societies which did not have a
(1) Constitutional History of England—May. Vol. II pp. 164-169.
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proper publicity, requiring licenses for debating clubs and reading
rooms; demanding that printing-presses and type-f ounderies be registered,
|
and that printers print their names on every book or paper and register
the names of their employers. Measures such as these were alarming, and
would doubtless have been resisted had not a portion of the press and
certain classes of society committed outrages on decency and order which
( 1 )
inspired a sort of fear of democracy among the better classes.
Americans who watched these things go on, and reflected on the course
which the Federalist party was following were coming to believe that
democratic principles were at stake, that the people of the United States
required no arbitrary government to keep them on good behavior, and that
the Alien and Sedition Laws were an exercise of power unnecessary, un-
justifiable and dangerous to American Liberty.
Of the various means of organizing, increasing, or spreading this
sentiment against the Alien and Sedition Laws the three most effective
were: publicity by means of petitions, pamphlets, and newspapers; win-
ning of public sympathy through several conspicuous trials; and an of-
ficial announcement of the Republican attitude in the Virginia and Ken-
tucky Resolutions. Either directly or indirectly, the Republicans und-
er Jefferson's guiding mind and hand were able to utilize these with
telling effect.
The newspaper, pamphlet, and petition served to promote local op-
position to the Alien and Sedition Acts. Nearly everybody was reached
by one of the three means. To these were added public meetings, which
were properly advertised in Republican papers, such a3 the Aurora of
Philadelphia, and Republicans V/atch Tower of New York, and their proceed-
(1) Constitutional History of England--May . Vol. II p. 169.
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) )
ings later noted. When the Acts were first passed petitions against them
were in abundance; but the summer of 1799 and winter of 1800 produced a
lull. These petitions were usually drawn up in the various counties, and
presented to Congress as a remonstrance against the Alien and Sedition
Acts, standing armies, stamp act, etc. As an example of the extent to
which this means was used by the Republicans to organize sentiment ag-
ainst the Alien and Sedition Laws, a list of some of the petitions laid
before Congress during the winter of 1799 is here given:
Cumberland County, Penn, presented a petition with 270 signers.
Mifflin " "
Chester " "
Citizens of New York
Newcastle County, Del.
Callatin stated in the House at this time that Pennsylvania alone
( 1 )
had presented petitions bearing in all about 18,000 names. In fact, con-
gress considered the advisability of repealing the Alien and Sedition
Laws during thi3 winter, but on February 25, 1799, a committee of the
( 2 )
House reported unfavorably on such action, and the repeal v/as voted down.
All of this served to give publicity to the feeling against the Alien
and Sedition Laws, and to spread the discontent.
The second means utilized by the Republicans to encourage anti-Fed-
eralist sentiment was made possible by the unfortunate effect produced
by the trials held under the Laws. The trials were so conducted that it
required but little effort for Republican writers and speakers to stimu-
late sympathy for the tried. Prosecutions were made out as legalized
persecutions, and the cry of "packed juries" and a partisan bench car-
ried weight with a great many people. There were ten printers and edit-
(1) Annals of Congress. 5th Congress; 3rd session.
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or3 who were convicted under the Sedition Law: Mathew Lyon stood at the
head; then followed Ha swell of the Vermont Gazette; Baldwin; Frothingham
( 1 )
and Holt of the New London Bee; Cooper; Callendar; and Duane.
The Callendar case affords a good example of the manner in which
the Law worked, and reveals also the exicted condition of the people as
a result. Callendar was a *fine specimen of a Grub-Street hack," the
reward, and not the content, of an article being uppermost in his mind.
The Republicans were in need of a strong partisan paper in Virginia,
and Callendar was placed in charge of the Richmond Examiner. The paper
soom became to the South what the Aurora was to the middle states and
the Independent Chronicle to the eastern states. But before this chanco
came he published a pamphlet entitled, "The Prospect before us" in which
he presented in strong terms a list of grievances against the Federal-
ists. The ten chapters were a violent protest of the X.Y.Z. affair, the
Fast-day ceremonies; the prosecution of Bache, the increase in the pub-
lic debt, the Alien Act, and the Sedition Act, etc. The theme of the
work was given in the preface as the "misconduct of the President" and
( 2 )
"the multiplied corruptions of the Federal government." Callendar was
brought to trial, and a few of his remarks were put into the indict-
ment upon which the case was based. The case developed great excitement
because Chase, the circuit judge, had said that he intended to humble
the Republicans and bring the haughty Virginia lawyers to submission.
The case really became a contest between Republican lawyers and a fear-
less, partisan judge. Callender was defended by three lawyers one of
whom later became well known as a federal Attorney-General, William Wirt.
The ca.se opened with the usual pleas for time in which to obtain wit-
nesses upon whom the defense relied, to prove the truth of the defend-
(1) History of the People of United States—AcMaster • Vol . II. p. 467
(2) " " " " " " " " " » Tj 469
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1ant’s statements. There was no doubt that Callender was guilty of pub-
lishing the statements, and as the defense had little to say on the facts
an attempt was made to argue the constitutionality of the Sedition Law.
Chase cut the defense short, and told the defendant’s lawyers not to re-
flect on the Court, which alone was endowed with authority to pass on the
constitutionality of an act. As the jury passed only on the facts ac-
cording to the law Callender was convicted, and sentenced to a nine
months’ imprisonment, required to pay a fine of *200, and to give secur-
ity for his good behavior for a terra of two years. There was no doubt
that Callender was a most malignant writer, and a poor sort of charact-
er, and possibly deserving of his punishment. The Independent Chronicle
of Boston printed an extract of a letter received from Richmond, where
the trial was held, and dated May 28, 1800. In it the writer said: "The
lenity and moderation of the judge in this particular (which were felt
and acknowledged by Mr. Callender himself) resulted from inquiry, and
were dictated, we presume, by a regard to his pecuniary circumstances."
Again, in the same extract: "the grand jury consisted of most respect-
able citizens, from different and remote quarters of the state; and
were addressed by the Hon. Judge Chase in a style equally pleasing, pert-
inent, and impressive." But the convictions, and the severity of the
judges, nevertheless, convinced the Republicans and others that the Sed-
ition Law was a bad law, and the support of the people was readily gain-
ed in denouncing it. The strenuous enforcement of the law during this
spring and summer of 1800, just preceding the Presidential election, was
most untimely for the Federalists on this account.
The third factor employed by the Republicans in opposing the Fed-
eralists was a party manifesto. The Republican leaders, and especially
Jefferson, believed that the time had come for such action, and the Vir-
--
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ginia and Kentucky Resolutions were the result. They had seen the Fed-
eralists gradually centralize authority in the government; they had felt
the force of tax laws passed to maintain a standing army, and an enlarg-
ed fleet; they saw the Federalists in the height of glory and power
backed by an excited and war-mad people; they had just seen three laws
enacted which gave the government wide powers over the individual and
which they believed were not warranted by any grant of power to the nat-
(1)
ional government. The Federalists had overstepped the bounds of dis-
cretion, and a rare political opportunity presented itself to the Re-
publicans. Or December 24, 1798, from the Virginia legislature, and on
November 10 from the Kentucky legislature the "principles" of the Re-
publican party were proclaimed in the form of resolutions. The source of
both resolutions was the same, though Madison was responsible for those
adopted by Virginia, and Jefferson for those adopted by Kentucky. This
fact attached to the resolutions an added significance, for Madison’s
prominence in connection with the drawing up of the Constitution gave
great weight to his interpretation, and Jefferson was the recognized
leader and oracle of the Republican party.
Of the two, the Virginia Resolutions are milder and fnore indefin-
ite in language—a fact due possible to the character of the men who drew
them up, and possibly out of consideration for the temperament of the
people who were to pass on them. The Virginia Resolutions went so far
as to declare that the federal government was limited in its exercise
of power to the enumerated grants of the Constitution, and should the
government exceed those granted powers it became the duty of the states
to "interpose". The Kentucky Resolutions, however, were more definite.
(1) The Federalist System—Bassett. p. 265.
,.
1They declared "that whenever the general government assumes undelegated
powers its acts are unauthoritative
,
void, and of no force;" "that this
government, created by this compact, was not made the exclusive or final
judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself": "that, as in all
other cases of compact among parties having no common judge, each party
has an -equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions as of the
( 1 )
mode and measure of redress".
Thus were the "principles" established, and it only remained to
provide the method by which the states might enforce their rights. The
legislature of Kentucky, in its resolutions of November 14, 1799 provid-
ed for that want by declaring "nullification the rightful remedy" .
The Resolutions were sent to the other states for their considera-
tion. The northern states upheld the legality of the Alien and Sedition
Laws, and declared that the Federal Courts were the legal interpreters
of the Constitution. The Southern states made no replies. A great com-
motion had been created in public life, for the State legislature had
given the Resolutions a wide publicity, and the earnest work of local
leaders kept this alive.
It now remains to consider the political effect of the Alien and
Sedition Acts in the election of 1800. As the election drew near it be-
came apparent that the objections to the Alien and Sedition Acts had
been made with telling effects. The contention that they violated the
first amendment of the Constitution; that Congress had exceeded its auth-
ority forpartisan reasons in passing them; that they were un-American
in spirit and tradition, reactionary and suggestive of monarchial autho-
rity—these were contentions that a population, still quite rural in
(1) Constitutional History of United States—Von Holst. Vol. I. p. 146.
(-
-
.
—
.
.
.
.
1.1
1character and dispostition
,
was quite ready to believe as true. The peo-
ple were sure to turn to the defenders of freedom of speech and of the
press, and to oppose those who threatened the same by any abuse of pow-
er.
And then it must have appeared true that a permanent enforcement of
the Sedition Law would have destroyed a fundamental element in represent-
ative and party government--the right of the people to criticise their
public officials, and thus hold them responsible. The Sedition Law made
this and party opposition illegal. The Zenger libel case had established
the "liberty of opposing arbitrary power by speaking and writing truth.".
By thus basing their objections on constitutional grounds the Republi-
cans were able to make out of the Alien and Sedition Laws most excellent
campaign material, and it greatly strengthened their position with the
voters .
In the second place the Alien and Sedition Acts called forth the
Virginia and Kentucky Resolution which exerted great influence on the
election of 1800. In 1831, Madison declared that these Resolutions were
for political effect, and were not intended as expositions of constitu-
tional doctrine. And herein lies the real significance of the Virginia
and Kentucky Resolutions. Their appearance was timed just right; for
they voiced not only a popular protest of two objectionable laws, but
they made those two objectionable laws, and the consolidating tendencies
of Federalism which backed them, the paramount issue in the campaign of
1800. Here was an issue entirely free from French associations, demo-
?
cratic in its tendency, and appealing to the consciousness of every man.
In the third place the Alien and Sedition Laws exerted a very great
influence on the election of 1800, because their enforcement kept the
people in a continual state of agitation and disgust. Trials under the
<.
.
.
.
,
1Laws followed each other with sufficient frequency to prevent the temper
of the people from coding. One or two convictions, obtained even with
considerable unfairness, would have been of but little importance in the
campaign talk of an election 3uch as that of 1800. But a trial here,
and soon a trial there, and then another, each creating local interest
and prejudice, made all told a very considerable impression. But not on-
ly that; the Federalists made the very grave political mistake of press-
ing trials during the spring and summer of 1800, just preceding the el-
ection. Republican leaders took good advantage of this condition of af-
fairs, and their speakers made political capital out of the continued in-
vitations which the Laws produced. In these ways the Alien and Sedition
Laws exerted a very great influence on the election of 1800. Alone they
might not have caused the Federalist down-fall, but a series of circum-
stances and changes gave to them most powerful support, and made the Re-
publican party quite irresistible.
Among these other factors which contributed to the Federalist down-
fall, the most distressing was the lack of co-operation within the Feder-
alist party itself, due to the ill feeling which Hamilton personally bore
toward Adams, The election of 1796 revealed the rupture between the two,
which was so widened by Adams’ handling of the French situation, that on
the eve of the campaign there came a break in the Cabinet, followed not
long after by an article by Hamilton in which he sharply criticised Adams’
whole conduct. Anything of the sort would have been unfortunate at
any time, but this happened at the beginning of the campaign. Hamilton
remarked: "for my individual part, ray mind is made up. I will never
more be responsible for him (Adams) by my direct sunnort, even though the
( 1 )
consequences should be the election of Jefferson." The loss of Hamilton’s
t.
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influence was unfortunate for Adams, especially in the crisis of 1800.
The second factor which strengthened the Republican position was
the increasing desire for peace. Reports from the new commission to
France were favorable; in February, 1800, Congress had authorized the
President to suspend enlistments; and in March a law was passed to dis-
charge the army. For the Federalists the campaign was robbed of that
warlike front, behind which they had found it so profitable to take
shelter. A natural reaction set in. Men had been living in constant
fear of war, work had been left for the purpose, and business had be-
come disturbed. They now we loomed the bright prospects of peace, but
they failed to give Adams or the Federalists any credit for it.
Another factor which helped the Republicans cause was the growing
feeling against England. Several incidents had happened which were ex-
tremely irritating. The commission set up under the Jay Treaty had been
suddenly suspended in 1799, after it was learned that England granted
about $5000,000 in spoliation claims, but had totalled up American in-
debtedness to about $19,000,000. Jonathan Robbins was arrested in 1799
by England on a charge of treason. Ke claimed American citizenship, but
a United States court decided against him, and he was released to Eng-
land. In 1798 an American warship, the Baltimore, was stopped, and fif-
ty-five or her sailors seized. Fifty were later returned, and the act
was disavowed by England, but such an adjustment could hardly atone for
the lack of respect which had been displayed on England’s part. Incid-
ents 3uch as these, and her disagreeable insistence on the impressment
of American sailors prejudiced the people against England, and against
(l) The Federalist System--Basse tt (Quoted from the Works of Hamilton)
p. 286.
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the party which they believed had played into England* s hands.
All of these influences conspired to render the more significant
the issue which the Alien and Sedition Laws had raised. The opposition
was more than the Federalists could withstand, and in the election which
followed in the autumn of 1800 a majority of the voters entrusted the
government to Thomas Jefferson and his Republican associates.
(1) The Federalist System—Bassett. pp. 280-283.
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